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PREFACE
There once was a law school. Of its sixty faculty members, twenty
were white male heterosexuals, twenty were white women, and twenty
were black. The white men had by some freak of history acquired a
great deal of power in the law school. To them went all the privileges,
from the best offices and courses, to exclusive use of the library and
high salaries. A committee of three such white men governed the law
school. One was a liberal, one a conservative, and the other a reaction-
ary. The women and the blacks lived an academic version of poverty
and disempowerment-no photocopying privileges, no library rights,
ten times more courses to teach, low salaries, and no say in the gover-
nance of the school. Good students shunned them because their recom-
mendations were worthless. Less stellar students needed their help
because they themselves were shunned by the white men, but the
blacks and women had no time to give them-they were so overworked.
At a certain point, the forty blacks and women decided to take
their case to the school's governing committee. They submitted a list of
grievances and demands; they asked for basic changes, even a little bit
of equality in the distribution of power and resources. The reactionary
member of the committee would not talk to them. The conservative
said that he was encouraged by their ability to recognize the virtues of
the system within which they worked, its capacity to be elastic and to
accommodate the need for change. He praised their activism and urged
them to continue on their course. But . ..
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"But," he said, "we cannot really satisfy your demands. Things just
will not change. The basic structures are what they are. I am sorry."
The liberal wondered at their inability to recognize the virtues of
the system within which they worked. "We have a genuinely free law
school here," he said, "one in which dissent is permitted. But I cannot
help you, for I fear what might happen if too much fragmentation re-
sulted from your demands. We have harmony now. Moreover, I have
heard that our friend and colleague, the reactionary, is planning a coup
if we give in to your wishes. Think of what that might mean; not only
would you have no rights, but ours would be taken away as well."
Frustrated and angry, the women and blacks took over the commit-
tee meeting, ejected the three sitting members, and named three new
members-one white male, one black, and one woman. This seemed to
them more fair, since there were forty women and blacks, and only
twenty white males. The new committee immediately voted to rescind
the exclusive privileges of the white men, to equalize the distribution of
work, and to reallocate the school's resources along strictly equitable
lines.
At first, the white men were unhappy with this, but they soon got
used to it.
I. INTRODUCTION
If I were to sum up the revolution that has occurred in the humani-
ties (and increasingly in the social sciences) in the past two decades, it
would be to say that what was before seen as substance is now seen as
representation. One could expand on that statement in several ways:
what was before seen as nature or reason is now seen as convention or
artifact; what was before a logic of necessity is now a highly contingent,
even random relation of terms whose connections obey no necessary or-
der; what was before a ground or foundation from which reasonable de-
rivatives could be deduced and applied to different situations is now
itself the effect of contextual situations and systems of signification;
what was before rationalist axiomatics is now rhetorical agonistics. At
stake here, of course, is a very old battle; we have been hearing about it
for at least 2500 years, ever since people first began to feel the need for
written laws and interpreters, philosophers and judges. With those de-
velopments came a sense that the terms in which social order-and
with it, as always, social power-would be defined somehow had a bear-
ing on the terms in which that world would be represented in the domi-
nant forms of social knowledge. From the start, how we represented the
world to ourselves had something to do with how we came together in
societies, how we forced other people to do our labor for us, how we
dealt with those who disagreed with our particular conception of what
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it meant to be part of our society. If a certain difference in representa-
tion would always have something to do with social change, the eleva-
tion to dominance of certain very powerful representations would also
always have something to do with how societies immunized themselves
against social change.
In this Article I will suggest some ways in which the philosophical
revolution of recent decades, which is usually associated with post
words like poststructuralism and postmodernism, might help us think
about the way societies are held in place by regimes of representation. I
am particularly interested in how this revolution allows us to imagine
new ways of formulating and constructing the societies in which we live.
I will discuss first the relationship between power, representation, and
violence. I will then suggest some ways in which representation can be a
lever for undoing the power that is so important for the maintenance of
a violent and unequal distribution of resources and responsibilities
under western capitalism.
II. REPRESENTATION AND VIOLENCE
That dominant forms of social knowledge have something to do
with the maintenance of social power is not a new insight. I would like
to suggest a strong relationship between the forms of representation
that shape social knowledge and the forms of representation that give
structure to our political institutions, especially inasmuch as those in-
stitutions are usually thought to embody ideals of fair and equal repre-
sentation in a liberal democracy.
By representation I mean such things as image, word, sign, symbol,
and story. A representation stands in for something else, allowing invis-
ible ideas to become concrete things or permitting an encapsulation of
something large or long in a brief and communicable form. Our
thoughts are represented in words, our desires in actions, our ideals in
institutions, and our fears in the images we project onto others.-The
principal mechanism of representation is substitution, but representa-
tion also encompasses displacement, negation, inversion, encapsulation,
spatialization, and the like.
In the postmodern age, three things that have been noticed regard-
ing representation are important to my concerns here: Its variability, its
active power, and its capacity to invert cause and effect. Representa-
tions vary, even representations of the same thing. Black people seen
(cognitively represented) from the perspective of a white racist will ap-
pear (be represented as) frightening, huge, evil, threatening. A white
liberal will picture (represent) them as needing white patronage in or-
der to succeed. A conservative will see (represent) them as being lazy
welfare thieves. Blacks themselves might represent African-American
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life in differing ways, depending on their social position, religious as-
sumptions, and personal history. The variety of representations is itself
representative of material differences of station and enculturation.
Representations signify and produce different kinds of attitudes
and actions. They have an active power: they make things happen, usu-
ally by painting the world in such a way that certain policies-from
domestic slavery to Cold War militarism-will appear justified. More
importantly, perhaps, the very act of painting itself enacts the policy.
The mapping out of a social terrain as an exploitable field of economic
possibilities already in effect transforms that terrain, denying other pos-
sibilities and producing an object that can be acted on without certain
constraints which might have come into play if the social world had
been conceived (pictured, mapped, represented) differently.
This is particularly clear when representations, which are suppos-
edly the effects of the things they represent, come to take the place of
their cause, the things themselves. If the images are powerful and per-
vasive, they can act on the things they supposedly represent by trans-
forming them to make them conform to the prevalent images of those
things. Victims of violence are especially susceptible to this process.
Rendered passive and subdued by violence, they are represented as
somehow deserving of violence, as wanting or needing it. An effect of
violence, a particular representation, thus comes to justify violence. The
representations produced by acts of violence come to be justifications
for further acts of violence. That violence then furthers the transforma-
tion of its victims into people whose behavior conforms with the domi-
nant representations of them. They become the passive, undeserving
things they were represented as being. Similarly, those rendered poor
by an economic system find comfort in excesses of self-indul-
gence-drug use particularly-that allow them to be pictured in images
that justify their being rendered poor. They are too irresponsible to de-
serve better. The result of immiseration-a certain fallen self-image
that gives rise to a public representation as undeserving-comes to oc-
cupy the position of a justifying cause.
The postmodernist revolution has drawn attention to the role of
representation in the construction of things we until now have assumed
to be pre- or extra-representational. As the prerevolutionary story went,
there was a world to be known, and we knew it using the representa-
tional and interpretive instruments at our disposal. Words stood for
things; narratives recounted our lives and histories; pictures gave us ac-
curate images of our various worlds. All we had to do was find the right
representations and our thoughts and all the truths that were to be
known through them would stand before us in their simplicity and ob-
jectivity, untainted by the instruments that seemed nonetheless so nec-
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essary to their existence.
It is no longer as easy to believe this story. The variability of repre-
sentation has drawn our attention to the way in which even supposedly
normal forms of social knowledge depend on representations. The ten-
dency of representation to substitute for its cause has made us suspi-
cious of claims to pre- or extra-representational truth; the active power
of representation has underscored the way we actively paint a world
into being out of the images we hold of it, images that are as much
projections of desire as depictions of real things.
Consider the example of the American nation state. American his-
tory books have attributed an almost natural coherence and linearity to
that particular set of rather contingent historical conventions through
narratives that posit an origin or cause from which a -plausible develop-
ment-geographic, political, or economic-can be said to derive. From
Huck Finn to Gary Cooper, novels and films have constructed an image
of the American character, the privileged subject of the national narra-
tive, as one endowed with the traits of self-reliant virtue and wise inno-
cence. Such themes as "the struggle for liberty" have given the
psychological imperatives of this subject-white, male, heterosex-
ual-semantic weight. One result is the exclusion of large segments of
the population from participation in the privileged subject's unfolding
history as anything other than minor characters and bit players. These
cultural exclusions always seem to imply political exclusions. If certain
experiences would be more valuable than others, certain points of view
more privileged, then certain social subjects would be more valuable
and privileged, too. The allocation of cultural meanings thus always
seems to be secured by strict semantic rules that are also political rules.
The purpose of the representational attribution of a sense of coher-
ence to a fragmented social world is always to justify the conversion of
antagonistic parts into a unified whole. Representations justify the vio-
lence that is required if dissonant particularities are to become conso-
nant totalities and if one part especially is to assume power over the
whole. Within the logic created by positing a coherent national commu-
nity where only fragmented and asymmetrical class, gender, and racial
groups exist, the violence done to maintain the hierarchies of power
within the so-called nation will, as a result of the attribution of identity
through cultural representation, seem a reasonable action required to
preserve the integrity of the whole itself. Yet it is the very action of
subsumption of part to whole that constitutes the larger unity in the
first place. If workers turned out of factories become homeless or if in-
fant mortality among blacks rises, it will seem a consequence of a logic
whose larger form is the very idea of a nation held together by rules
everyone must obey if the nation is to exist at all. The great trick of
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American liberalism is to call these rules the rules of freedom, which
makes them seem like no rules at all.
One important purpose of the representational positing of a na-
tional community is to neutralize the potentially destructive possibili-
ties of social and historical contingency. If the rules of the national
community were not grounded in authoritative meanings given by the
dominant interpretations and regimes of signification, then the violence
done in the name of those rules and meanings would not seem justified
and might result in counter violence. By creating a sense of coherence
and unity, representations secure a sense of authority that is as much
political as cultural. In this process certain representations and mean-
ings come to occupy a foundational and grounding position in the logic
of signification that defines the national community. Other meanings
that represent both alternative interpretations of a particular social re-
ality and alternative ways of structuring that reality come to be either
marginalized or repressed.
Freedom is perhaps the most important of these grounding repre-
sentations in the American context. As a representation, freedom gains
authority for itself from the founding narrative of the struggle against
monarchial absolutism. The representational construction of America
would be based on certain images of male action and economic possibil-
ity, a merchant class's utopia of desire restrained only by the measure
of harm done to other merchants. Having been endowed with a power
of its own from these founding images, freedom became an agent of
action in its own right, legitimating violence against those who fell
outside the boundary of the merchant utopia as well as against practi-
tioners of alternative ideals of a more communal society. The represeri-
tation continues to saturate our political culture, empowering particular
subjects and preventing those public institutions that represent inter-
ests not served by the ideology of economic freedom from playing too
intrusive a role and acting as a restraint. The selective service done by
this concept-that in an economic free-for-all only some win and many
lose-stages a situation in which the representation sanctions the legiti-
mate violence of dispossession. Particularly for those consigned to la-
bor, the representation has little relevance other than as the name for
the actions they are permitted during time off from the prison of ex-
ploitation. Freedom has thus become more evidently what it has always
been from the outset-the right to violate.
The men who invented the concept of freedom and whose self-rep-
resentations are embodied in the contours of possible actions licensed
by freedom would not quite agree, of course. Their struggle with their
fathers in an authoritarian patriarchal culture (John Stuart Mill being
the exemplar) made liberty both a valuable and a useful concept, one
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that secured needed latitude but retained a vertical ordering of social
groups. In a world without the old paternalist forms of political author-
ity, these firm semantic grounds were needed. Alternatives were always
available, of course, if only because alternative social subjectivities ex-
isted, from women to workers to slaves. The alternative possibilities of
life that emerged from the repressed majority's experiences of exclusion
from the white male world of axiomatized autonomy registered as much
in the realm of cultural representation as they did in the high rates of
repressive violence that always seem to be the male way of greeting in-
fringements on autonomy.
If freedom, for example, has a positive meaning of unrestrained ac-
tion whose limit is harm done to others of one's own gender, race, and
class, it also has the negative meaning of refusing to heighten the prior-
ity of social responsibility. That negative meaning is important because
it is not simply another possible meaning. It suggests another world pic-
ture entirely and is always inscribed as its repressed converse in the
actions licensed by the doctrine of freedom. The political ideal of free-
dom of choice presupposes an already disintegrated social world in
which contending factions relate to each other as externalities that
merely signify other more important material differences of power.
Choice of parties bears within it the negative meaning of the refusal of
an ideal of a social community that can negotiate its differences because
those differences are truly political. In other words, they are not repre-
sentative of any significant material differences of station or power, but
rather are differences of opinion regarding the shape of a world to
which all are bound equally because all participate and hold shares
equally. The economic ideal of freedom harbors a similarly repressed
alternative meaning that signifies an alternative world construction.
The principle of free economic action means also a refusal of a possible
world in which agents need not face each other as dissociated antago-
nists. The meaning of freedom as dissociation and opposition derives
from an implied background meaning that is its converse: the ideal of a
world of conjugated association without opposition.
The meanings I am describing are possible, but necessarily re-
pressed. They must be repressed because their availability suggests the
radical contingency of a social universe whose supposed ontological sta-
bility is confirmed by the stability and univocality of its representa-
tions. That contingency is contained by the positioning of terms like
freedom as foundational meanings within a particular regime of signifi-
cation. Differences of meaning, which are differences of possible world
constructions, thus come to be differences over the interpretation of a
set of terms whose status as founding terms cannot be challenged. Lib-
eralism's great success was not that it substituted the rationality of law
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for the violence of feudal authority, but rather the discovery that se-
mantic repression works just as well as physical force.
Only in recent decades have we come to think twice about the
power of this representational system. People who have been violated
by the cultural representations that subsumed their experience and by
the system of political representation that obliterated their voices have
begun to demand representation of their own-native Americans whose
land was stolen, women whose existence as subjects was denied, and
blacks whose lives were shattered-all for the sake of wise innocence.
What emerges after this questioning is a sense of an entirely different
world that demands new representations which do justice to the broken
lives that are the legacy of America's emergence as a nation. If power
spoke in a narrative without shadows, according to a line of develop-
ment at once straight and self-sufficient that moved toward goals of
freedom of action and antisocial self-empowerment, which were particu-
larly satisfactory ideals for the white, heterosexual male subject of the
narrative, then the questioning of power would necessarily challenge the
monovocality of that history. If the violated were to speak, then there
would be many voices, not one. If power was by definition the dis-
empowerment of others and their submission to the experience of self-
dissociation, then counter power would not speak in the mode of em-
powered subjectivity, confident of its project, secure in its unviolated
source, and destined toward its inevitable goal. Stories of counter power
would require a sense of the tentativeness of other perspectives, of his-
tory as a frequently violent field of contingencies, of narrative itself as a
fragile and constant exercise in self-construction.
III. FOR CONSTITUENCY DEMOCRACY
If counter power would require a different system of cultural repre-
sentation that would not subsume dissonant lives to a single term like
freedom, it would also, I will now argue, require a different system of
political representation that would not subsume the whole community
to one of its parts. There are strong links between the representational
structures that shape the ideological realities and imaginative possibili-
ties of American culture and the actual structures of political represen-
tation which hold that culture and that society in place. My attempt to
chart this course is fraught with danger; it is the kind of thing that can
earn you a bad reputation, especially in the political culture of the
American left, which is devoted to the idea that real things are real
things and that there is a clear line between real things and imaginary
ones. Even though it can easily be demonstrated that all the ideas, be-
liefs, and assumptions that people bring to social interaction come from
culture, from the representations, narratives, and images that form our
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psychologies, still one must be careful. And for good reason: in society
and in reality, violence is done; though it may be done in the name of
certain representations, still, real hands do the harm. Or can we make
so clear a distinction, even in this realm?
I recently saw a Soviet documentary about a young man who mur-
dered two people. He was robbing them with a gun in his hand, and
when the woman laughed at him and ran to the door, he shot her. In
trying to explain his feelings at that moment, he said she made him feel
small by not taking him seriously, even though he did not really want to
be taken seriously as a killer because he had never harmed anyone
before. He was overwhelmed by shame and anger, by a self-image that
fell short of what he liked to think of himself as being. Later in the
film, one learns that his mother, a rather tough-minded person,
shunned him and left the family. A recurring image of this abandon-
ment no doubt influenced his psychological disposition when confronted
with his female victim's derision. The young man did indeed do the
killing, but there is something else about this situation that requires
attention. It underscores the difference between the criminalization of
people and the description of those actual, empirical, and very real
processes of representation and self-representation that go into the pro-
duction of violence. The young man killed in part because of a particu-
lar representation of himself that emerged in the interaction with his
female victim. That representation was deadly for his self-image and
contributed to his willingness to commit violence. And violence must
always be interpreted, I think, as the physical projection of psychologi-
cal fantasies. At the origin of much male domestic violence is a problem
of self-representation, of a certain dangerous vulnerability of self-imag-
ing. The silencing of that violence, its acceptance through particular
strategies of interpretation by victimized women, often has to do with
the need to represent the world in a particular way, as a place where
violence must somehow be justified, where it is necessary or logical
rather than contingent and random.
This framework should tell us something about why authoritative
representations in general, which posit a ground of necessity behind
contingent institutions like the nation state or the capitalist market, are
necessary precisely in societies constructed around these institutions.
As they are formulated on the principles of aggression and defensive-
ness, those institutions promote the kind of violent instability that re-
sults in a need for a sense of justice, a sense that the threat of violence
which is the basis of enforced community in a society founded on the
free right to violate is somehow part of a necessary order, some system
of meaning that makes the violence seem rational. The greater the
levels of unjust violence in a society, one might say, the greater the like-
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lihood of encountering representations of the just necessity of violence.
What we learn in studying the just world syndrome in domestic or
intimate violence, therefore, can help us account for how a representa-
tional process allows large sectors of our population to accept violent
subordination. The process is akin to euphemism, and it operates
through a substitution that annuls one reality in favor of an image that
bears a significant nonrelationship to that reality. I say nonrelationship
because the reality itself is one that withstands semantic ordering. It
seems to have no meaning; it offers no consolation. The Soviet man's
confusion of representation at the moment of violence, the nonalign-
ment between the woman's derisive representation of him and his own
desired self-image (derived in part no doubt from the image his depart-
ing mother left with him) was solved by a representation of himself as
capable of violence-indeed, by a representation of himself as a perpe-
trator of a violence that annulled a negative and threatening represen-
tation of himself. The desire on the part of violated women to make
some sense of a violent social world executes a similar substitution. The
contingency and apparent randomness of the violent event is effaced
and subsumed to a meaning that substitutes a sense of order for what
appears to be without logic or reason.
Representation is, therefore, very much a part of the world, and I
will now argue that one can relate the operations of cultural and psy-
chological representation to the system of political representation in a
republican democracy such as that of the United States. Our political
system imposes a structure of meaning on a potentially random and
contingent social world. Meaning provides order, and order is achieved
through substitution. As in cultural and psychological representation,
the semantic order imposed bears a significant nonrelationship to the
world represented. In political representation, as in much cultural rep-
resentation, the structure of substitution is one in which a privileged
representation does not relate to the social whole in crucial ways; it
must not so relate in order to effectively subsume the contingency and
diversity of that world to a manageable scheme of order (as well as an
orderly scheme of management).
If social violence always involves the exclusion of others from
power, or resources, or rights, the representations that enable such vio-
lence are themselves exclusionary. They lie or misrepresent by allowing
one group's representations of the world to become the standard for
constructing that world. What is striking about ideals like freedom is
how little they actually represent of the reality they supposedly name.
The managerial executive class of white male businessmen may be rela-
tively free, but those whose exploitation lies at the origin of their
wealth-the large throngs of people, many of whom are female or non-
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white, who put in hours each day, year after year, producing and doing
things for those men-certainly are not. It might be more accurate to
name this reality with a mixture of representations: free domination, for
example, or more elaborately, majority coerced labor-minority com-
munally subsidized liberty. These do not sound as nice as freedom,
however, and I wonder sometimes if we cherish certain cultural and po-
litical ideals precisely because they offer the image of a compensatory
utopia of unrestrained action that has very little to do with the debased
reality they supposedly depict. One thing at least is certain: These rep-
resentations allow a part of reality to stand in for the whole. They per-
mit one group's self-defining ideal to substitute for what might be the
real interests of the majority, thereby displacing those interests and re-
moving them from view as well as from the realm of legitimate public
discussion.
If we can say that one problem with the representations that con-
struct things such as the idea of a nation state is their inaccuracy, the
same is true of the system of political representation. The current polit-
ical system aids the violence of exclusion precisely because it is not rep-
resentative enough. The system lies, if you will. Although the authority
and legitimacy that systems of political representation claim for them-
selves rest on a notion of fair and equal representation, wealthy white
males bear at best a metonymic relationship to the social whole. The
basic process of political representation, like that of cultural representa-
tion, is one of substitution and displacement. Members of the upper
sectors of society, mostly male and mostly white, acting as political rep-
resentatives, stand in for and supposedly represent the interests of ev-
eryone else. It is a matter of substituting part for whole again, and
again one would have to say that the result is a displacement and re-
pression of the real interests of the larger group.
I say this with trepidation because one can easily claim, of course,
that if people wanted something other than what they get, they could
make those demands felt. It is here precisely that one begins to perceive
the contact between cultural representation-understood as a system
for reinforcing the conventions essential to the maintenance of the
founding economic, political, and social structures of power in a soci-
ety-and political representation. When the only permissible represen-
tations around are ones like freedom that make the whole game seem
somehow legitimate and that make alternative formulations like wealth
redistribution or economic democracy seem abridgements of everything
the nation stands for, then it is unlikely that people will be able to
express their needs in anything but the terms endorsed as legitimate by
the existing system of power. What gets represented in political repre-
sentation, if you will, is cultural representation. If the system of politi-
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cal representation is meant to translate or communicate the needs,
interests, and desires of the population into policies and programs, then
the difficulty in thinking about those feelings in anything but licensed
representations illustrates something crucial about the kinds of limits
such political representation is likely to respect, even when it is operat-
ing most naturally and spontaneously, without any apparent manipula-
tion. The process works in the other direction as well. When an
inaccurate system of political representation holds sway, the rise to
dominance of cultural representations that question the governing
power is unlikely.
This is why, when societies change in radical ways as in Eastern
Europe, everything changes, from the words and images that circulate
in culture to the political and economic institutions. And this also is
why, when societies like America do not change radically, nothing
changes. The culture continues to circulate the same self-serving ideol-
ogy, and the process of exploitation that fuels the enormous private ac-
cumulation of a community's wealth remains the same. Dominant
representations of reality turn out to be dominant predictors of reality.
But what if things were to change? What would it look like? Let us
assume that the process of displacement and substitution which allows
one partial perspective to stand in for the whole is not such a good idea,
either culturally or politically. Everyone should have a direct say in
what happens. Politically, that will require a different kind of represen-
tational system. Culturally, it implies the full democratization of cul-
tural production, a full inclusion or representation of voices in what is
now a minority affair. The second depends, I would argue, on the first.
A great deal of attention has been given to the issue of cultural democ-
racy, but we have simply assumed the rationality of our current system
of political representation. How might it be reformulated?
One possible answer might be called constituency democracy. It
would be a system of more accurate representation based on the as-
sumption that the different interests of constituencies are best repre-
sented when they are represented directly by those constituencies. This
means that the ideology of totality in political representation, the as-
sumption that a part can stand in for the whole, would be put aside.
White, well-to-do men would no longer represent black, not-so-well-to-
do women. In place of this system would be a more fragmented and
multiple process that would favor no single part by allowing it to stand
in for and displace all the others. More concretely, all social groups with
a significant membership, a significant relationship of subordination to
hitherto dominant groups, or a significant history of exclusion from rep-
resentation and power-women, sexual and ethnic minorities, and the
various unrepresented lower income groups-would be proportionately
[Vol. 43:17711782
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represented in the political "decision-making bodies of the nation. If half
of the country is female, then half of the representative decision-mak-
ing body either should be female or chosen exclusively by women. If
one-third of the population is black or gay, the same would be true of
them. If two-thirds of the nation makes less than 75,000 dollars a year,
then two-thirds of the representatives also would make less than 75,000
dollars a year.
Obvious problems would arise in this kind of system. Should one
category such as income prevail over another such as gender, for exam-
ple? Are Irish Americans a significantly oppressed and excluded group?
All these questions require thought, negotiation, and the development
of tests and standards. I would argue for proportional demographic rep-
resentation for at least those groups that recent history has taught us
have been victims of violence and exclusion-nonwhite racial minori-
ties, women, lower income people, and victims of ethnic violence and
prejudice based on sexual preference. But clearly, any such system
would have to be extremely flexible-open in an absolute way to change
and revision.
Nothing like this will ever take place, of course, as long as power
exists. Power in a pseudo-democratic situation depends on the substitu-
tion of one group's interests for another's and on the cultural represen-
tation of this process as the fulfillment of a political ideal like freedom.
What is interesting to imagine, nevertheless, is how large a difference a
small thing like a change in representation might make. What would
blacks, or working people, or women, or sexual minorities do if they
were represented in Congress according to their numbers? Perhaps fear
of the answer to that question keeps us where we are, with the forms of
political representation that we now possess.
IV. REPRESENTATION AS AN ANTIDOTE TO VIOLENCE
I want to conclude with one final justification for the kind of politi-
cal representation I have just described as constituency democracy. It
would help bring an end to violence by according a power of speech, of
self-representation, to those whose victimization depends in part on
their banishment from the realm of public representation, or on their
positioning within that realm as objects rather than expressive subjects.
Violence depends on a particular kind of representation of the victims
of violence, one that is not informed by the victims themselves. Like
the substitutional rhetoric of political representation under republican
liberalism, the representations that enable and encourage violent vic-
timization abolish others by substituting a partial projection for the
whole picture of another person or people. Violence spreads through a
process of representation, simulation, and copying. The violence of sub-
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jugation and frustration in the economic realm, for example, becomes a
repetition and reenactment of that same violence in a more controllable
domestic arena. Past violence is reenacted when victims are turned into
perpetrators whose beings as potentially independent subjects are fore-
closed by the images of past harm they bear with them. The public
ethic of violation in a nation state that prides itself on its ability to beat
up on smaller, dark-skinned neighbors is copied in a circulation of more
private forms of violence. The violence of a society founded on the free
right to violate returns to society in the violence perpetrated by its vic-
tims against themselves and others.
If representation lies close to the heart of social violence, represen-
tation of another kind enables its solution, its exorcism, so to speak.
The bringing of repressed material to conscious representation is the
secret of psychotherapy's quelling of private violence. With the entry
into social speech of the voices of those repressed others who are the
objects of society's violence, public violence finally begins to find its
limit. We cannot hurt those who speak to us and to whom we speak; to
allow speech is to accord power and existence as a subject, to grant a
right of representation both culturally and politically. In the power of
this subjectivity is entailed an inevitable process of recognition, the rep-
resentation of the other as like oneself. At a certain point, the end of
violence is the inability to harm oneself. Crucial in this endeavor is the
creation of pathways that permit more equal forms of representation,
forms that do not displace or substitute and thereby annul perspectives.
We will need a different kind of political democracy to accommodate
this need-new, more accurate forms of political representation. Only
then, I think, will American culture be capable of achieving the kind of
community it now can only pretend to be.
AFTERWORD
I have cheated by including in my Preface a response to my respon-
dent, Professor Robert Covington. I want to elaborate a bit more here
on some other possible responses to Professor Covington and to others
from the audience who offered challenging and helpful comments.
It would be inaccurate, as Professor Covington rightly points out,
to characterize the American tradition as being without exception vio-
lent toward nondominant racial and sexual grodps. The violated have
had their sympathizers in the ruling group, and some of these propo-
nents wrote novels and made movies. Even as zealous a perpetrator of
representational violence against Native Americans as John Ford would
make films like Cheyenne Autumn late in his career, which portray
quite sympathetically the hazards of being nonwhite in nineteenth cen-
tury America. I would suggest, however, that we should not confuse ex-
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ceptions with rules. Indeed, the exceptions must be understood as
arising out of and in response to the overwhelming preponderance of
the rules.
I have treated Professor Covington's other point-that too much
change risks provoking a right-wing reaction-with perhaps too much
irony in my prefatory anecdote. This is a liberal version of the con-
servative slippery slope argument that a little equality can lead quickly
to too much equality (whatever that is). In my oral response at the
Symposium, I suggested that the fragmentation Professor Covington
fears is already upon us, and it assumes the shape of the very harmony
he thinks is so worthy of preservation. If one is a white male and
thereby a member of the favored group, then the current unequal sys-
tem of power and resource distribution, with all of its attendant acts of
repressive violence on the part of the legal system against less favored
groups, might indeed seem a praiseworthy harmony that should be pre-
served. But if one belongs to one of the fragments that is an object of
legal violence and of subsumption to the white, male-dominated
whole-if one is gay, or black, or female, or poor-then such harmony
will seem less virtuous. As always, where we stand determines what we
see.
Someone in the audience wondered if some of the subjectivities I
described as needing representation may be created by society. I think
the point here was that the categories I used may not have any onto-
logical grounding outside social construction. Are gays or women or
blacks separable categories, or are all these groupings merely conven-
tions applied to much more complicated, differentially constituted, non-
identical subjective processes? I think that is true in reality, but again
we must take into account the dominant representations that allow cer-
tain groups of people to be fit into those categories and treated in cer-
tain ways as a result. Those representational acts of categorization are
also real, and because they are the categories of existing power, they are
the ones we must contend with in seeking to defuse this power.
Cornel West wondered if substantive issues of wealth distribution
and the like might not be more important than the alternative forms of
political representation that I proposed. I suggested then, and suggest
again now, that the alternative form of representation would be more
likely to guarantee that those issues would actually be raised in a legis-
lative assembly than would the current form of representation. Now, for
example, the concerns of lower income people are not addressed as
structural problems by political representatives. If those people were
represented according to their numbers, such avoidance would be less
likely.
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